Previous studies indicate that Colombian farmers make production decisions based on informal sources of information, such as family and neighbors or tradition. In this paper we randomize recipients of price and weather information using text messages (SMS technology). We find that relative to those farmers who did not receive SMS information, the farmers who did were more likely to provide market price information, had a narrower dispersion in the expected price of their crops, and had a significant reduction in crop loss. Farmers also report that text messages provide useful information, especially in regards to sale prices. We do not find, however, a significant difference between the treated and untreated farmers in the actual sale price, nor changes in farmers' revenues or household expenditures.
Introduction
Many agricultural products in Colombia today are not produced, or are commercialized inefficiently due to farmers' lack of information on prices. Access to such information in rural areas is limited and costly. A recent study of information demand and supply in the agricultural sector, conducted by USAID-MIDAS (2007 -2008 , found that the sources of information are not well known (Perfetti et al., 2007) . Small producers usually sell their products on their own farms, knowing only prices in the local area. Our baseline survey assesses farmers' knowledge of prices by asking if they had to sell their product today, at what price would they sell it. We find that 26 percent of farmers do not report any price for their product if someone came to their farm to buy it; 43 percent do not know it for the municipal market; 6 percent do not know it for Bogotá, and 55 percent do not know it for the market of their department (the largest unit of sub-national government in Colombia). In light of these figures, this study randomizes provision of weather and price information to farmers and determines whether this information improved their welfare.
Colombia's mobile phone technology has almost full connectivity coverage across the population and territory. There were 37.8 million activated lines during the period of this study, corresponding to a coverage rate of 96 percent for the population over 5 years of age.
2 Two important reasons why SMS can be a successful tool to disseminate information include the relatively low cost of a SMS (40 percent of the cost of a one-minute cell phone call), and the ability to send information to many farmers at the same time. In this study we exploit the high levels of connectivity in Colombia and the low cost and high use 3 We evaluate the impact of the program on three types of outcomes: i) agricultural activities, ii) farmers' welfare, and iii) spillover effects of the program. The first group, agricultural activities, includes the following measures: ability to report a price in different of SMS technology to estimate the improvement in welfare of farmers randomly selected to receive detailed weather and price information via text messages.
2 Population counts in 2008 correspond to the projections reported by Departamento Nacional de Estadísticas (DANE). Number of lines active in the second trimester 2008 comes from the quarterly report from Comisión Regulación Telecomunicaciones (CRT). 3 In the baseline survey, 78 percent of farmers indicated that they knew how to receive text messages and 34 percent indicated that they knew how to send text messages. This difference is not significant between the treatment and control group. markets, price differential and dispersion of data reported by farmers relative to officially reported data, crop loss, harvest delay, crop storage, SMS as a substitute of sources of information on planting and selling, change in the crops that are planted or markets where products are sold. The second group of outcomes includes household revenue and expenditures.
The third group of outcomes examines externalities of the program by measuring a change in the number of contracts or agreements made with other farmers.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section includes a review of the literature on the relation of technology adoption to welfare and peer effects. In Section 3 we provide a detailed description of the experimental design, and Section 4 describes the data from our two rounds of surveys and other sources of price and weather information that we used. In Section 5
we explain the empirical specification, followed by the results in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
Previous Literature

Papers on Technology Adoption and Welfare
Using the roll-out of cell phone coverage as a quasi-experimental design, researchers have looked at cell phones' impact on welfare and price dispersion across markets. These studies found that with the introduction of cell phones, welfare improved and price dispersion diminished (Jensen 2007; Aker, 2008) . These improvements appear to be due to a reduction in search costs. Similarly, Beuermann (2010) shows how the introduction of at least one payphone in rural villages in Peru generated great improvements in sale prices and reduction of agricultural production, which in turn reduced the use of child labor for agricultural production. Montenegro Unlike the papers cited above, in this study, rather than using the roll-out of cell phone coverage as a quasi-experimental design, we directly test the hypothesis that reductions in search costs affect welfare by randomly selecting farmers to receive price information for their crops in different markets via text messages. We then test the extent to which this reduction in search costs affects different measures of farmers' welfare.
Papers on Technology Adoption and Peer Effects/Externalities
Papers that have looked at peer effects on technology adoption include Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Oster and Thorton (2009) . The first paper finds that imperfect management of new technologies and farmers' experience are barriers for adoption, but own experience and neighbors' experience with technology increases farmers' profitability. The second paper finds that peers provide information about the new technology, but adoption depends on the value given by the individual to the technology. Like these two papers, we also study the influence of technology adoption by neighbors or relatives.
Experimental Design of the Project
The study took place in the departamento of Boyacá, where two irrigation associations, Usochicamocha and Asusa, provide their services. The irrigation associations provided a complete list of members including their cell phone numbers. Among the users there are (crop) farmers and cattle ranchers, but given that our population of interest is farmers, we used the census of economic activity to determine the proportion of farmers in each unit. We then calculated the proportion of surveys needed in each irrigation unit to have a (15 percent)
proportional sample of farmers in each area. Our sample includes 500 surveys, 66 percent (335) of them in Usochicamocha municipalities and 33 percent (165) in Asusa municipality.
We isolate the program effect by using random treatment assignment. Specifically, we randomly assigned farmers who received the information to the treatment group, while the other farmers who signed up for the initiative were in the control group. To participate in the study the farmers needed to fulfill the following conditions: i) cell phone ownership; ii) voluntarily agree to sign a consent form authorizing us to send text messages with relevant agricultural information; iii) be at least half-time employed in commercial farming activities (other than for self-consumption); and iv) belong to one of the irrigation associations.
At the time of the baseline survey farmers were told that about half of them would be randomly selected to receive the "treatment" (price, weather and administrative information).
255 individual farmers received the treatment. The remaining 245 farmers were assigned to the "control" group. We conducted an additional randomization at the unit level to capture spillover effects of the information shared among neighbors. Each area of irrigation is divided into 11 units, for a total of 22 irrigation units. The 22 units were paired according to their observable characteristics and we randomly chose 143 farmers in 10 of the 22 units as a source of extra treatment.
The time line for the intervention is given in Figure 1 . The follow-up survey was conducted in NovemberDecember 2009, after the farmers had made their decisions on sales and commercialization of their products. Our experimental design compares the treatment to the control group, before and after the intervention, by using information from the baseline and follow-up surveys.
Source of Price Data
The Corporación Colombiana Internacional (CCI) administers the System of Price Information in the Agricultural Sector (SIPSA-Acronym in Spanish). SIPSA includes information for more than 700 products in 66 markets in 18 departamentos. Each day at 9 a.m. we received information provided by the CCI. This price information corresponds to the average prices of transactions made earlier that day. Markets operate from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. Although the price 4 The markets and products were chosen according to the reported relevant market of the area, and conditional on availability of information. The main crops grown in this region in order of importance are: onions, potatoes, corn, beans, peas, beet, lettuce, and broccoli. Since certain crops are sold in specific days of the week, the information sent accounted for the seasonality of products sold in markets. 5 In these 10 day the person from the CCI at Tunja, our source of information, was not able to send daily prices. 6 Administrative messages were sent by the irrigation associations and typically meeting or payment reminders.
information provided by the CCI is publicly available by internet at 3 p.m., 7 the farmers have limited internet access at home and in their village. In the survey, 4 percent of farmers reported having home internet access and 15 percent reported access in their village.
Source of Weather Data
The Instituto de Hidrología, Metereología y Estudios Ambientales (IDEAM) provides a weekly report with weather forecasts including minimum and maximum temperatures, probability of rain fall, drought, floods and frost alerts. The IDEAM agreed to include our areas of study within their forecast models, which allowed us to provide accurate information for this intervention.
Description of Baseline and Follow-Up Survey Data
We collected baseline characteristics in the first round of surveys prior to the intervention and report these in Table 1 . Table 1 also includes some socio-demographic characteristics that we were able to match from the Census of the Poor Survey.
8
The average farmer in our sample is 50 years old, and 70 percent of the farmers are male, with 6 years of education and 29 year of experience in farming activities. They spend 34 hours a week working on agricultural activities.
The baseline survey includes socioeconomic questions, as well as information on agricultural production and commercialization decisions. As Table 1 reports there is only one significant difference across the treatment and control group, indicating that before the intervention the two groups are very similar.
To ensure the quality of the information collected we asked farmers to keep records on the price, quantity, date and location of the products sold. The second round of surveys collected follow-up information on the key outcome variables: sale price, production, transport, crop information shared with neighbors, crop loses and specific questions about the intervention for those who reported receiving SMS information useful for their agricultural activities. We followed 95 percent of the people in the second round. To encourage participation there was a raffle of a pesticide spraying machine.
7 Available at: http://www.cci.org.co/cci/cci_x/scripts/home.php?men=101&con=192&idHm=2&opc=199 8 We have personal identifiers in the Census of the Poor and in the baseline survey which enable us to match the information to the whole family. The match rate was approximately 86 percent for Asusa and 75 percent for farmers in Usochicamocha.
Since the price information sent via text messages corresponded to the typical crops grown in the region and not necessarily those grown by an individual farmer, there was variation across farmers on the number of crops for which they received prices that coincided with their particular crops. Some farmers may have received information on all of their crops while others on none. We exploit this variation in our analysis.
Empirical Specification
Since we observed the same farmer in two periods to evaluate the effect of the text messages we used a difference-in-differences approach, and a first differences with farmer fixed effects. Our estimating difference-in-differences equation is: And our estimating first difference with farmer fixed effects equation is:
where i denotes the individual farmer; p denotes the product; u denotes the irrigation unit; and t denotes the first or second round of surveys. Y iupt corresponds to the outcome of interest. T it is a treatment indicator which takes the value of 1 if the farmer received text message information.
Post t is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 after the initiation of the program. We use different definitions of post depending on the timing of the outcome of interest. We use: post to take into account the period after the initiation of the program; post_crop takes into account that the farmer planted after the initiation of the program; and post_sale takes into account that the farmer sold its product after the initiation of the program.
Prod ipt
is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if farmer i received text message information regarding one of his product. Extra iu corresponds to the number of producers who received treatment in the farmer's irrigation unit. X it is a vector of farmers' characteristics including: education, experience, age, gender, percentage of time dedicated to farming, size of the crop, storage capacity, own means of transport, whether the farmer is credit constrained, distance from the farm to markets, γ u are irrigation unit indicators to capture any characteristics that are common across irrigation units but do not change over time, and γ p are dummy variables for the (3) where the variables are defined the same way as in equation (1). This specification could help to absorb noise and give more flexibility in the parameter β 3 than the fixed effect specification.
Parallel to the three equations presented above, we test for spillover effects by interacting these same specifications with the following measures: number of text messages received (directly from the program or indirectly from a participant), frequency of visits to neighbor farmers, and the number of people the farmer knows who are enrolled in the program interacted with frequency of visits to neighbor farmers. All of these different measures are used as proxies for the amount of contact with information that an individual can have, and we expect to get from them a measure of the externality effect of the program.
Results
We are interested in the following outcomes: i) whether the farmer is able to report prices in different markets, ii) whether the farmer is using text messages as a substitute for sources of information to plant or sell, iii) the difference between the officially reported price and the price reported by the farmer at the time of sale; iv) the difference between the expected sale price and the officially reported price, and the dispersion in prices reported by the farmers, and v) the extent of crop loss.
Reporting Prices in Different Markets
Reporting a price corresponds to the simplest outcome we can test in this experiment. We want to know whether sending price text message information can have an impact on the self-reported knowledge of prices by product and market. The dependent variable is constructed from the question in the survey where we ask the farmer: "If you had to sell your product today, what would be the price you think you will get after a negotiation in the farm, municipal market, Bogotá and departamento market?" Independent of the accuracy of the value reported, we give the value of 1 if there was a price reported and 0 if the respondent answers that he or she does not know. Tables 2a and 2b 
Text Messages as a Substitute of Sources of Sales Information
We test whether the information received by farmers has been useful for their agricultural activities, specifically for sales. In Table 3 we use four different outcome variables: i) the farmer reported text messages as a source of information in the follow-up survey; ii) the farmer reported changes in the source of information used for selling relative to the sources of information reported in the baseline; iii) an interaction of these two outcomes that captures a change in source of information including text messages as an important source of information; and iv) the farmer reports text messages as a new source of information and there are changes in the importance of sources of information.
The table shows that the coefficient related to the treatment effect is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for all outcomes except for change in source of information (column 2), we also include the treatment interacted with the dummy variable that indicates that the prices sent via text messages coincided with the products that the farmer is planting, but we do not find a differential effect of the treatment for different products. 10 10 Our survey also includes data to test whether the information sent affected planting decision or helped in solving problems related to the crop. This hypothesis has not yet been tested.
Price Differential at the Time of Sale
We construct the difference between the sale price reported by the farmer and the sale price reported by the official data from CCI in a given week in Bogotá and Tunja, two markets where these farmers sell and where we have official data from CCI. Table 4 does not show a significant difference, consistent throughout different specifications, in the sale prices obtained by treated farmers compared to the farmers in the control group. But there is a positive and significant effect of the sale prices of the products reported in the text message information for the whole sample after the intervention, which could be interpreted as a spillover effect of the program.
Price Differential and Price Dispersion Using Expected Prices
Using the same question as in the first outcome (reporting a price in different markets), we construct the difference between the sale price reported by the farmer at a given market and the sale price from the CCI official data in a given week for the corresponding market (we call this the expected sale price), results are reported in Tables 5a, 5b, 5c. There is some evidence that the treatment group reported a higher sale price in Bogotá, but we do not generally find evidence that treated farmers differ much from the control group in the expected price reported.
We also construct monthly price dispersion of expected prices. The results, presented in Tables 6a and 6b, show that in the four different markets treated farmers have lower price dispersion in the price they report than the control group of farmers. This implies that farmers are able to negotiate and sell their product closer to the market price, which will be a fair price.
Crop Loss
We constructed the three following measures of crop loss: i) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the farmer had any type of loss in his crop, ii) a continuous variable corresponding to the percentage of crop loss, and iii) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the farmer had weather related loss. The results related to these three variables are reported in Tables 7a,   7b and 7c respectively. All of the specifications in Table 7a consistently show statistically significant differences between treated and control farmers; treated farmers are between 11 and 14 percentage points less likely to suffer a crop loss.
Additional Outcomes
Other outcomes that we could study in the future include behaviors with respect to harvest delay, crop storage, profits, change in the crops that are planted or markets where products are sold. We did not find significant effects for household revenue and expenditures, which might be due to the short period of the implementation of the program.
We have explored the externality effect of the program and have some preliminary findings that consistently point to a positive and significant effect only when the data are used as a cross-section. Once the individual fixed effect or lagged variable models are used, however, there are no significant effects. Specifically we see positive externality effects in terms of crop loss due to weather. This is consistent with what treated farmers say about the usefulness of the information received, where they give a grade of 4.1 out of 5 to the weather information.
Conclusion and Policy Relevance
In this paper we tested if access to price information via text messages changed farmers' behaviors. In particular, we analyzed whether treated farmers had better knowledge of prices and as a consequence were able to extract higher prices for their products. We found that the information sent indicated a change in the treated farmers' perceptions of prices, but did not seem to affect their actual sale prices. Other results indicate that inexpensive technological interventions quickly become useful sources of price information and reduce the probability of weather-related crop loss. In terms of welfare improvement we did not find an effect on profits or household expenditures, but this might be due to the short-term nature of the intervention.
In the future we plan to study the external effects of SMS technology use in communities when family and neighbors share information. In particular, we will explore whether farmers are transporting their products to other markets as a result of this information. 
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